

BULGARIA AND YUGOSLAVIA

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becoming premier in October, 1919, Stambolisky's first task was that of signing the peace terms drawn up by the victorious Allies.

After

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The Treaty of Neuilly, November 27, 1919, reduced Bulgaria to a smaller area than it had held before the First Balkan War of 1912 and imposed new burdens. Bulgaria lost the Aegean coast (Western Thrace) to Greece, southern Dobruja to Romania, and strips of land on the west to Yugoslavia. The army was limited to a total of 20,000. Reparations amounting to \$450,000,000 were to be paid in thirty-seven years, beginning in 1921. The existence of Bulgarian minorities in all the neighboring states furnished a basis for revisionism which steadily grew, particularly after the rise of fascism throughout Europe in the thirties.² The provision for an exchange of populations with Greece greatly heightened the volume of refugees who streamed into Bulgaria, adding to the political ferment and economic burdens of the country. In these and other ways, the settlement exacerbated conditions under which radicalism thrived.

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Stambolisky won a commanding position in the parliamentary elections of March, 1920, and proceeded to ride roughshod over both the middle class and conservative parties on the right and the Communists on the left. He instituted a number of reforms, including a land law designed to break up the crown lands and larger estates, the imposition of a heavy income tax, and the establishment of a compulsory labor service which in the first four years of operation secured the equivalent of five million wage days of work for the Ministries of Public Works and Railways. In foreign policy he sought to fulfill the treaties and to effect a reconciliation with Yugoslavia among whose Communist and Agrarian parties his concepts of Slavic federation found support. His dictatorial methods, however, won him enemies on all sides, not least among them being the Macedonians who opposed his policy of rapprochement with Yugoslavia. In June, 1923, he was overthrown by a *coup d'état* organized by a group of intellectuals, led by Professor Tsankov, and the League of Army Reserve Officers, among whom Colonels Velchev and Georgiev were leaders. A few days later Stambolisky was assassinated.

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Following the Stambolisky regime, the Tsankov government (1923-26) represented a swing to the right. "Communist" insurrections and violence were suppressed with great severity. The increased activity of the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO) caused difficulties at home and abroad, although after the assassination of its leader Alexandrov (1924) it was split into two factions under Protoguerov and Mihailov who became bitter rivals. A threat of war with Greece arose, but was averted by the action of the League of Nations. A more conciliatory government

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² See G. P. Genov, *Bulgaria and the Treaty of Neuilly* (Sofia, 1935).

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Communists, Agrarians, Democrats, and republicans. In the summer the Soviet Union, against whom Bulgaria had not declared war, began to press for the ousting of the Germans and a reversal of the policy pursued since 1941. On September 2, a new Bulgarian government, headed by a former secretary of Stambolisky, Konstantin Muraviev, and including former Premier Mušanov, announced the full restoration of democratic freedom and rights, a return to neutrality, and the nullification of the Tripartite Pact. It also dispatched representatives to Cairo to negotiate an armistice with Great Britain and the United States and, on September 8, declared war on Germany. In the meantime, however, Russia, not fully satisfied with the course being pursued, declared war on Bulgaria on September 5. This confusing situation was clarified four days later when Muraviev was succeeded by a new government which had the full support of the "Fatherland Front." It was led by Kimon Georgiev, who was alleged to have experienced a change of heart since his participation in the *coup d'état* of 1934, and included his former colleague, Colonel Velchev.

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Before the end of September Russian military forces had moved into the country and were rapidly turning the Bulgarian army, now placed under the command of a Russian General, Tolbukhin, against the fleeing Germans. By the formal armistice terms, signed in Moscow on October 28, 1944, Bulgaria promised to withdraw from all territories occupied in Greece and Yugoslavia, to restore all properties of the United Nations and make reparation for damages, to rid Bulgaria of all pro-Axis organizations, to cooperate in the arrest and trial of war criminals, and to accept an Allied Control Commission which would regulate and supervise the execution of the armistice. Since Russia held a dominant position in the Commission and since Bulgaria was prepared to follow Communist leadership, her lot as an ex-Axis satellite differed little from that of Yugoslavia.

Reconstruction and Peacemaking

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Reconstruction in both Yugoslavia and Bulgaria took the form of a revolution led by Communists and was patterned after the policies and practices of the Soviet Union.

The National Front in Yugoslavia

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The Tito government, established in Yugoslavia in 1945, promised that it would "comply with the fundamental and general principles of constitutional government" and that it intended to found a democratic, federative state. This was to consist of Serbia, Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Macedonia. Provisional governments were formed in each of these units in April and May, 1945. While Tito's ter-

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side of the East-West division that seems to have split Europe and the world.

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With respect to boundary settlements, Yugoslavia failed to get Trieste and an additional slice of Carinthia, although she won most of the Istrian Peninsula and much of Venezia Giulia which she had demanded. At the same time Bulgaria retained the part of southern Dobruja awarded her in 1941, but failed to get an outlet to the sea through "Aegean Macedonia" as she desired. Although both governments, along with Albania's, were guilty of permitting, if not fostering, attacks upon Greece by armed bands in support of Greek Communists and refused to cooperate fully with the United Nations investigating committee, it is not yet clear whether they hoped to wrest part of Macedonia from Greece by force or looked forward to a secession by a Communist group which would join the Yugoslav federation.

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It is certain, however, that Bulgaria's relations with Yugoslavia were conducted in the spirit of the declaration of January 10, 1945 in favor of "the closest possible collaboration with the peoples of the new Yugoslavia." Tito more than once reciprocated this sentiment, raising the conjecture that perhaps the federal structure of Yugoslavia might be extended to embrace Bulgaria. Until August, 1947, however, collaboration took the form of an agreement, completed on August 2, upon a mutual assistance pact and full cultural and economic cooperation, described in the announcement as virtually wiping out the frontier between them. At the same time Yugoslavia made a series of agreements with Albania that integrated its economy closely with Yugoslavia's. Thus the century-old dream of Balkan Slavic leaders came close to realization by means of the binding force of Communism. In this and in many other respects Bulgaria and Yugoslavia are experiencing a revolution still at full tide. What the ultimate ebb and flow may bring still remains obscured by the uncertainties and imponderables not only within their boundaries, but perhaps even more by these in the world around them.

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*The author wishes to acknowledge the valuable assistance of Miss Ruth Savord, Librarian of the Council on Foreign Relations, in compiling this bibliography.

for new wars. Nevertheless, Bulgaria obtained an outlet on the Aegean Sea and this was recognized as a reasonable act by all Balkan peoples (1913). 175

The events in Europe that brought about the First World War found Bulgaria on the side of Germany. The violation of essential Bulgarian rights after the Balkan wars and the outrage exercised by the former allies (1912) of Bulgaria over the Bulgarian population, left under the foreign domination, had much to do in leading Bulgaria to take this fatal decision, which was absolutely opposed to the highest interests of the Bulgarian nation. The Carnegie Foundation made an investigation (1914) to establish the truth about cruelties practiced by both sides over the peaceful population and their abuse of the international rules for carrying on war. We may safely say that Bulgaria came out with honor as a result of this investigation, while the same could not be said about the Greek army, as we will point out this further in our study. 721

The World War of 1914-1918 ended for Bulgaria with the Treaty of Neuilly. Bulgaria was punished in an unprecedented manner. The biggest punishment, however, was depriving her from the outlet on the Aegean Sea, which all Balkan peoples unanimously recognized as her reasonable right in spite of their inimical attitude. 728

26. The Peace Treaty of Neuilly, 1919.

If we consider the Peace Treaty of Berlin as a fatal step for the peace in Europe, then the Treaty of Versailles - Neuilly was the unpardonable repetition of the same fault for the Balkans. It was a peace arrangement fostered by statesmen who were blinded by revenge. Clemenceau, Lloyd George, Balfour, Sonino and Orlando were the authors of a peace of „politicians“. Dillon¹⁾ speaks of them as follows: „They were novices in international affairs. Geography, ethnology, psychology and political history were forbidden books for them. What they lacked might have been supplied, to a large degree, by a selection of counsellors more widely informed than they. They chose, however, the help of mediocrities. Since the heads of the main governments, by implication, pretended to be the authorized representatives of the human

¹⁾ Dillon, The Peace Conference; cf. H. G. Wells, *opus cit.* vol. III, p. 1114.

728 race, invested with unlimited power, it should be pointed out that this claimed ordination was seriously opposed by the public press. Almost all popular newspapers criticized the dictatorship of this band of prime ministers¹. H.G. Wells points out very properly how the Peace Conference was reduced from a Council of Ten to a Council of Four (Wilson, Clemenceau, Lloyd George and Orlando) and how it gradually turned from a conference of free and open discussion for the future welfare of all, to an old fashioned diplomatic conspiracy. Was not the Berlin Conference of 1878 this kind of „old fashioned diplomatic conspiracy?“ History was repeating itself for the Balkan Slavs. The ground was being prepared for future wars.

There could hardly be a better description of the situation after Versailles 1918, than the one given us by an enlightened and farsighted writer like H. G. Wells:¹)

„When we consider the transitoriness of the settlements effected by the diplomatists, we are impressed at once by the feebleness of their diplomacy and the realization of the strong intractable forces that defeated their manœuvres and arrangements. We are still more impressed by the uninstructed ineffectiveness of the new international idealism imported into European interchanges by President Wilson. His Fourteen Points were left by these treaties like a row of ruined and tattered houses in a bombarded village. Some had gone altogether; other were twisted out of recognition. The first attempt to produce a world law passed away like a burst of laughter in a tavern“.

- 000 27. What a French Author A Frenchman, Cyprien Robert, writes in his book 1844: *Les Slaves de Turquie Serbes, Monténégrins, Bosniaques, Albanais et Bulgares; leurs ressources, leurs tendances et leurs progrès politiques*; Paris, 1844, vol. I. p. 228:²)

„A subjected and unfortunate nation lives at the outskirts of Europe. Its name is hardly known to the world of to-day, but its people are worthy of our attention. They are the Bulgarians, who have preserved their old habits, their burning faith, their noble character, even during the time of their worse

¹) H. G. Wells; op. cit. vol. III, p. 1124.

²) German translation — *Die Slaven in der Türkei*, Stuttgart, 1851; 2-nd edition; vol. 2, p. 191.

000 28. Western Thrace.

Western Thrace is an Aegean Sea province surrounded on both sides by the lower courses of the rivers Maritza and Mesta and on the north by the watershed between the river Arda and the Aegean Sea (Fig. 5). This inclosure slopes towards the said sea and has a sea coast line of about 85 miles or 135 kilometers. Its surface is about half the size of Albania and the USA state of Connecticut is 1.33 times larger than it.

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


Fig. 5. Bulgaria and Western Thrace.

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Travellers, who studied the ethnographic limits of the Bulgarian people during the 18th and 19th century speak of the Bulgarian character of Western Thrace.

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The border between Bulgaria and Western Thrace, or the territorial outlet of Bulgaria to the Aegean Sea, has a history of its own. The San Stefano Treaty gave an Aegean Sea outlet to Bulgaria on the gulf of Salonica, by the estuary of the Vardar River, and also from the gulf of Or-

phano to Kavala near Burughiol beyond the mouth of Mesta River. The Berlin Treaty deprived Bulgaria of this outlet. The London Treaty of 1913, at the end of the Balkan War, gave Bulgaria again a territorial outlet to this sea and established the Eastern frontier of Turkey at the line Enos—Midia. 728 •

The Bucarest Peace Conference granted Bulgaria an outlet between the estuaries of Mesta and Maritsa rivers, which included the natural sea port of this region, Dédé-Agach. This port was the terminal at the end of the Maritsa valley, along which run the roads to the Aegean Sea. The lower course of Maritsa became the border line between Bulgaria and Turkey, according to an understanding which took place between the two states in 1915. It provided the cession of a strip of land around Adrianopol to Turkey, which included the railroad station of that city, Kara-Agach, at the railroad line from the Bulgarian frontier to Dédé-Agach.

The Great War of 1914—1918 ended with the peace of Neuilly (1918) for Bulgaria. It brought countless sanctions of revenge to the Bulgarian people. One of them was found in article 48, which provided: „Bulgaria renounces in favour of the Principal Associated and Allied Powers all her rights and titles over the territory of Thrace which formerly belonged to the Bulgarian monarchy and which, being outside of the new frontiers of Bulgaria, are not allocated to any one as yet. Bulgaria binds herself to recognise the decisions of the Principal Associated and Allied Powers with regards to these territories. The Principal Allied and Associated Powers bind themselves to guarantee the freedom of economic outlets for Bulgaria to the Aegean Sea. The conditions of this guarantee will be determined later.“

This was a deception, because it had already been decided to give these territories to Greece, and the Principal Allied and Associated Powers renounced later the guaranteed outlet also. At the Conference of San Remo (19—26 April, 1920), which was a continuation of the Paris Peace Conference and in which Bulgaria did not take part, it was decided, at the suggestion of Lloyd George assisted by Venizelos, that Greece should obtain both Western and Eastern Thrace as far as the line of Tchataldja. General Charpy, governor-general of Western Thrace from 1918 until 1920, started the withdrawal of his forces,

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1878. Treaty of peace of S. Stephano



1878. Treaty of peace of Berlin



1913 Treaty of peace of Bukarest



1920 Treaty of peace of Sevres



Fig. 6. The Aegean Coast passes from hand to hand, like a play ball for 67 years!

upon which the Greeks occupied this territory. Article 1 of the Peace Treaty of Sèvres, signed August 10, 1920, stipulated the following: „The Principal Allied and Associated Powers declare that they transfer to Greece all rights and titles they have over the territories of Thrace, by virtue of article 48 of the Peace Treaty of Neuilly with Bulgaria.“ Article 4 undermined the guarantee given to Bulgaria for an economic outlet to the Aegean Sea, by substituting for it the stipulation „freedom of transit is recognized over the territory and ports of Greece“. Bulgaria was not a party to these negotiations and decisions and the Sèvres Treaty was ratified by none of the participants in this conference. Consequently, Bulgaria claimed properly that the question about her territorial outlet was open still by dint of right. The subject was taken up again at Lausanne (April 23 — June 24, 1924), in connection with peace negotiations between Turkey and Greece. These negotiations ended by returning to Turkey Eastern Thrace up to Maritsa. Turkey received also that strip of land around the railroad station Kara-Agach in such a queer arrangement, that the railroad from the Bulgarian frontier to Dede-Agach runs at the present time first through Greek territory, then through Turkish and again through Greek territory.

This is then the famous „freedom of transit“ over Greek territory!

29. Fooling with a Sea Coast. The Aegean Sea coast passed from hand to hand like a play ball for 67 years. It was a foul game played against the interests of the Balkan peoples and Eastern Europe in general. Here is a graphic representation of the different stages of this game (Fig. 6).

30. The Aegean Sea Locked by the Greeks! The Balkan Peninsula is surrounded by three seas: The Adriatic and Ionian sea, this is the sea of Yugoslavia, Albania, Greece and Italy; the Black sea, the sea of Bulgaria, Romania, Turkey and USSR; and the Aegean sea, which is the most accessible sea in South Eastern Europe. Greece wishes to have it locked for herself (Fig. 7)). Could there be any serious defence for such a policy from the

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The pre-war period

After the amputation inflicted on her by the Treaty of Berlin, it was natural for Bulgaria to devote from the moment of her emergence as a political entity most of her resources and energy to repairing the mutilations she had suffered. She thus diverted to this aim a large part of the vital strength she would under different circumstances have entirely consecrated to her cultural and economic advancement. And if, in spite of this incubus Bulgaria yet attained to such remarkable material development within the six decades of her independent existence it may be surmised with certainty that the progress achieved would have been a record one had she started on her career as a nation under more auspicious omens.

From the very start she was encouraged to spend an unduly large proportion of her resources on the organisation of her army by the Russian officials who supervised the setting up of her administration, and owing to the natural desire of the Bulgarian people to liberate their enslaved kinsmen, who had been thrust under foreign dominion by the bungling politicians at the Berlin Congress, it was extremely difficult to discourage expenditure on this head. This tendency was further encouraged by the armament firms which showed themselves always obsequious and ready to facilitate the securing of the necessary credits for financing the supply of war material and thereby helped to involve Bulgaria into an indebtedness beyond her capacity.

The Bulgarian State was further saddled with heavy obligations such as that of assuming a certain indebtedness towards Turkey in the form of an annual tribute and that of defraying the cost of the Russian military occupation. It was also forced to provide for the construction of those

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175 sections of the projected international railway which was to traverse Bulgarian territory, an onerous liability for a young State, since such a railway was of little importance to local traffic, and further, it was constrained owing to its political vassalage to maintain a uniform custom tariff with that of Turkey and was thereby debarred from increasing its revenue. The country having been maintained in a most backward condition while under Turkish rule, had to create of a piece a complete administration, organise an army, construct a net-work of roads and railways, build ports, and improvise a minimum of equipment of which it was entirely deficient, possessing few roads and only one railway of international, but of little local importance, namely that between Rustchuk and Varna, of a total length of 224 klm. belonging to an English company and which the Bulgarian government was obliged to buy out a few years later. Towns and villages which had been destroyed during the Russo-Turkish war of 1877 and the insurrection which preceded it had to be rebuilt, and even the bulk of the land which belonged to Turkish landlords had to be purchased by the Bulgarian peasantry before the latter could be installed as owners in the fields they cultivated.

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175 Bulgaria being a pre-eminently agricultural country with practically no other revenues save such taxation as could be raised from her industrious peasantry was thus faced with the Herculean task of providing out of her meagre means the indispensable equipment of a modern State, and it speaks volumes to the credit of her people that so much should have been achieved within so brief a time, all the more so since the country owing to its undeveloped and backward state had very few resources to draw on. Its main assets being the unflinching labouriousness and the extreme thriftiness of its peasantry.

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According to the latest data, the number of war invalids receiving pensions on April 1, 1934, were 13,014 for a sum of 83,278,502 leva annually, and those of widows and dependents of soldiers killed during the wars 67,763, necessitating another annual outlay of 204,340,386 leva. In spite of the economic straits the Bulgarian exchequer is in, it has yet been found possible to make grants to 77 aged Russian veterans who had participated in the war of liberation of 1878, and who owing to the Bolshevik revolution have sought refuge in Bulgaria. The latter in spite of her difficulties is still harbouring some 19,000 émigrés and providing largely out of her slender means for their upkeep, a fact which inflicts a formal disavowal to the slanderous charges brought against Bulgaria as to her alleged ingratitude towards Russia.

The Financial burdens of the Treaty of Neuilly.

The amount of the indemnity imposed on Bulgaria and euphemistically termed 'reparations' was fixed according to Article 121 of the Treaty of Neuilly at 2250 million gold francs and decreed payable within 37 years and to bear 5% interest. Article 132 of the said Treaty decreed that the costs of reparations would constitute a first charge on all the assets and revenues of Bulgaria. Article 133 bound Bulgaria to defray the total cost of the Allied armies in occupation of Bulgarian territory until the coming into force of the Treaty, this cost being finally assessed at 25 million gold francs. Article 137 constrained Bulgaria to assume a part of the Ottoman debt, a matter which has not yet been fixed. Another article, 177, provided for the indemnification of the material damage suffered by Allied subjects through Bulgaria's action in the war out of the property of Bulgarian subjects seized in Allied countries. The amount awarded as damages by Arbitral Courts

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175 specially constituted for the purpose amounted to £ 581,317
728 for British subjects and to 52,269,771 French francs plus
£ 109,210 to French subjects, and smaller sums to Belgian,
Italian and Greek subjects.

Articles 125 to 128 ordained other payments in kind which could more aptly figure as reparations than the 2250 million indemnity imposed on Bulgaria, and which amply sufficed to repair whatever damage the Bulgarians might have caused in the territories they had invaded as the writer pointed out in the "*New Europe*" of July 29, 1920 in the following terms:

"Bulgaria is asked to make reparations for damage, and these are assessed at a figure far exceeding the destruction the Bulgarians might have wrought in the Morava and the Dobrudja. The total value of these regions does not surpass 5,000 million francs, of which land figures for 70 per cent and buildings, cattle, etc. for the balance.

It is obvious that the Bulgarians could not have carried off the land, and it may be taken for granted that the damage inflicted on property is infinitesimal, and represents only a fraction of its total value.

On what grounds then is Bulgaria asked to pay 2¼ milliards as "reparation". The demand for such an indemnity is all the more unjust since the Treaty stipulated for the delivery by Bulgaria of a determined number of live-stock. It is contended that this quantity of cattle represents what the Bulgarians appropriated while in occupation of the regions they invaded. If this were so, it would be just to insist on the execution of this clause; the number demanded from the Bulgarians, however, exceeds all reasonable estimate of the losses in cattle which our Balkan Allies might have incurred. Amongst other things Article 127 provides for the delivery by Bulgaria of 1,000 mules to Serbia, when, according to Serbian official statistics, the total number of these useful animals in the whole of Serbia was only 349 in the year 1910! This example will serve to show that "reparation" is not the appropriate term for our demands on Bulgaria. the latter obviously aim at securing more than what the former designation implies. The Treaty also imposes on Bulgaria an annual delivery of 50,000 tons of coal to Serbia by way of compensation for the destruction of Serbian coal-mines by the Bulgarians. This is an unwarranted and unjustifiable decision, not only because all mines in Serbia were

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exclusively worked for and by the Germans, but also because Bulgaria does not produce sufficient coal for her own requirements. Before the war she used to import coal not only from England, but also from Serbia, and this consideration alone ought to have prevented the formulation of demands that clearly seek to cripple the economic organism of a former enemy State.

The punishment already meted out to Bulgaria has been sufficiently severe, as have been the sufferings and losses which the war has inflicted on her population. Our object, therefore, should not be to increase the disadvantages under which Bulgarians toil, nor to force them to slave for others, for this is certainly not Bulgaria's mission in the world. If we wish her to make her distinctive contribution to civilisation, we should rather lend a helping hand to her people, and assist them out of their present difficulties. The laboriousness, sobriety and honesty of the average Bulgarian are virtues which commend themselves to all, and if they could only be made to realise that in the subordination of self to common interests lies the secret of a nation's greatness, then nothing could prevent them from becoming one of the foremost factors in the moral and economic renovation of the Near East."

Article 177 of the Treaty permitted Greece, Rumania and Yugoslavia to formulate certain complementary demands for indemnification. An utterly unjustified proceeding in view of the fact that Article 121 had settled the total amount of indemnity to be imposed on Bulgaria. Though the Hague International Tribunal to which the claim of Greece had been referred to had decided on Sept. 24, 1924 in this sense, yet the Bulgarian government decided to meet the Yugoslav and Rumanian claims owing to political reasons and to its fear of a Yugoslav military intervention at the time of the Communist revolt which took place in Bulgaria during September 1923. Thus Bulgaria assumed further liabilities towards Yugoslavia and Rumania amounting to 320 million leva and 110 million lei.

The imposition on Bulgaria of the obligation to defray the cost of the Allied armies of occupation was equally unmerited and contrary to the spirit of the

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728 armistice concluded at Salonica on Sept. 29, 1918, since the latter stipulated that Bulgaria was not to be treated as an occupied territory and only provided for the temporary occupation of certain strategical points. In fact the headquarters of the Allied armies only notified the Bulgarian government that they would occupy the port of Varna on March 16, 1919 and its occupation was maintained for a very brief time. The secret annex to the Salonica armistice provided that Bulgaria should be treated as a benevolent neutral, and it even stipulated for the co-operation of the Allied armies with part of the Bulgarian troops under certain eventualities. Had it been possible to resort to arbitration it is more that probable that Bulgaria would have been dispensed from payment on this head. At any rate those in charge of the Allied troops in Bulgaria were perfectly aware that they were not entitled to treat Bulgaria as an occupied country, for if during the three or four days following on their arrival in Bulgaria they affixed at the barracks they occupied a sign-post bearing the inscription "Headquarters of the troops occupying Bulgaria" on the representations of the Bulgarian government they immediately altered the title to "Headquarters of the Allied troops in Bulgaria".

The only sensible provision in the Treaty was article 122 which provided for the Inter-Allied Commission to reconsider from time to time the resources and paying capacity of Bulgaria and empowered it to recommend either a reduction or a postponement in the payment of the sums due by Bulgaria.

It was very unfortunate for Bulgaria that she did not have a strong and popular government capable of defending her interests, and ready to resign in sign of protest whenever she was being bludgeoned and coerced into paying on account of reparations sums which were crippling her national economy and checking her develop-

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ment. Had her rights been entrusted to more stalwart defenders she would have certainly met with as lenient a treatment as that meted out to Austria and Hungary, but unhappily her rulers' first thought was how to maintain themselves in office and avoid all source of conflict which might jeopardize their posts. This selfish consideration made them always bow meekly before such dictates as were issued by the International Reparation Commission whose sole consideration was to squeeze as much as possible out of Bulgaria. It is not to be wondered that the late Count Apponyi, that untiring champion of Hungarian rights, should have shown his aversion for such servile meekness, by remarking to an occasional Bulgarian delegate at Geneva, a fact which Prof. Gheorgov, a former rector of the Sofia University communicated to the Bulgarian Press: "I am at a loss to understand why your delegates keep silent when such important questions relative to your country are being discussed at the assembly of the League of Nations?"

According to articles 124, 136, 142 and 145 of the above mentioned Treaty, Bulgaria was to be credited with certain sums as against the 2,250 million gold francs of reparations imposed on her. These amounts were computed in a pamphlet issued by the Bulgarian Commissariat of Reparations on Feb. 2, 1923 as totalling 3,857,548,624 gold francs and classified under the following heads:

Relative to Article	124	1,088,957,132
" " "	136	266,274,479
" " "	136	65,635,727
" " "	142	275,473,910
" " "	145	2,148,814,923
" " "		3,510,753
Maintenance of the Inter-Allied Commission		
Indemnities paid to Allied subjects in territories occupied by Bulgaria		8,881,700
Besides the above, war material of a value of 633,211,117 gold francs had also been handed over to the Allies.		

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728 Though certain items referring to Art. 124 and 145 are disputable, it seems that the Bulgarian government had some ground to insist upon its claims being taken into consideration, yet all the delegates of the Allied Powers did when the protocol of March 21, 1923 which settled the mode of payment of reparations was signed, was to divide into two parts „A“ and „B“ the total sum of 2,500 million gold francs claimed from Bulgaria, decreeing that 550 millions bearing 5% interest, labelled „A“ share should be payable in 60 annuities, the first of which was fixed at 5 millions and was to increase gradually to 43,396,336 in 1934 and continue at that rate until 1983, while the remainder, amounting to 1,700 millions would stand over until 1953 without interest when such sums as Bulgaria had a right to claim would be deducted from it, though the Bulgarian counterclaims largely exceeded this figure.

Apparently little consideration was paid to Bulgaria's condition, to her having been amputated of her wealthiest provinces, to the utter exhaustion of the resources of the peasantry which had bravely shouldered single-handed the whole burden of the world war, and beguiled by the transient prosperity of a section of the population engaged in the cultivation and trade of tobacco which prospered exceedingly during the years 1919 to 1923, owing to the elimination from the European markets of Greece and Turkey as producers of Oriental tobacco, while engaged in fighting each other, and which trade is reckoned to have brought an inflow of some 4,000 to 4,500 million leva to Bulgaria during this period, the delegates of the Allied governments proceeded to bleed Bulgaria white.

Indispensable public services such as education and hygiene¹ were ruthlessly curtailed, the upkeep of railways

[165] ¹ The rate of mortality from tuberculosis in 1928 was 30.53 per 10,000 in Bulgaria as against only 8.28 in Great Britain.

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and highways was completely neglected, nothing was done to reorganise agriculture and thereby permit the peasantry to recuperate after the exhaustion caused by the war, all this in order to economise on the budget and provide for payments to Bulgaria's insatiable creditors.

The callousness and cynicism with which the Allied Powers, great and small, treated Bulgaria at this time is simply revolting and is best illustrated by the manner in which the Des Closières affair was liquidated. Among the documents published by the Bolsheviki were the minutes of the Russian Ministerial Council which revealed that on July 30, 1915 the question of finding 200 million francs wherewith to buy up Bulgarian cereals and at the same time to suborn Bulgarian politicians came up for discussion. Sazonov refused to besmirch his hands in this unclean affair and he left the management to England and France who provided 175 millions necessary for financing this operation, Russia supplying the balance of 25 millions. Several Bulgarian politicians were involved, and the irony of fate decreed that instead of serving the Entente's interests they should have unwillingly helped to consolidate the position of the tottering Radoslavov Cabinet. At the end of the war, the British and French governments demanded the restitution of all sums advanced by their agent, Des Closières, in Bulgaria, not only for the moneys supplied by the latter to various politicians for the purchase of cereals which had been ultimately confiscated by the Bulgarian government, but also for all the sums spent clearly on bribery and which figured in the claim lodged against the Bulgarian government as money spent "on propaganda and publicity". It is doubtful whether one can find another example of such brazen cynicism in inter-State relations and one marvels at the shamelessness of both British and French officials who had the impudence not only to avow that they had bribed, but that they

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7-8 should go to the length of demanding the reimbursement of the bribes from the very State the citizens of which they had attempted to corrupt. It is fortunate that the Arbitral Court before which these monstrous demands were formulated adjudged that the only part of the claim which was valid was that relative to the stocks of grain confiscated by the Bulgarian government and for which it was condemned to reimburse £164,264 plus 10,854,854 French francs, though as deputy G. Yurfov had declared in the Sobranye on Feb. 22, 1927, of the 200 millions francs of Entente money spent, only 18 or 20 millions had been used to buy cereals and the balance had been employed in bribing politicians.

The controversy which arose between the Greek politicians Venizelos and Cafandaris over the Greek Stabilisation Loan likewise casts a lurid light on the incentives which actuated Entente politicians when they heaped on Bulgaria the staggering burden of indemnities under which she has collapsed. At a speech Venizelos delivered at Salonica in the summer of 1932, he blamed Cafandaris for allowing himself to be cajoled by the French government into a remission of its war debt to Greece, amounting to 408 million gold francs, in order to secure French support for the flotation of this loan, after Venizelos had arranged in collusion with the French to lump the sum in question into the reparations claimed from Bulgaria! Obviously any stick was good enough to beat luckless Bulgaria with.

The present writer attempted several times from the columns of the *Manchester Guardian* and the *Near East* to point out that this policy of extortion and coercion which was being applied to Bulgaria was threatening to undermine her social structure, that its inevitable consequence would be the pauperisation of Bulgaria, since the country's financial capacity had never been taken into

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175 proper consideration, but unfortunately his efforts proved
 728 unavailing. The country, in fact, even before the war, was only able to pay her way by cumulating its foreign indebtedness, it would therefore hardly be expected that after being shorn of its most fertile regions and ruined by the war, the burden of which it had borne single-handed, Bulgaria would be able to meet unaided the problem of her pressing economic re-organisation and at the same time provide for the payment of the crushing indemnities imposed on her.

No wonder that M. Stambulliski and his peasant colleagues perceiving that the Allied Powers were intent on draining every particle of moveable wealth out of Bulgaria, threw all restraint to the winds, and set themselves to embezzle and appropriate whatever public money they could lay hands on. Guinet's judicious pronouncement: „Otez à une terre toute chance d'avenir, elle enfante d'elle même la barbarie comme les ronces" was thus fully confirmed, for if a feeling of despair had not been instilled in the Bulgarian people by the pitiless and grasping policy of the Allied commissaries, the Agrarian party while it was in office would not have lost all sense of measure and thus hastened by its insensate policy the ruin which loomed large on the country's horizon.

The purblindness of the financial experts who had imposed the colossal burden of reparations became evident a few years later, when Bulgaria in spite of the financial assistance she received in the form of the two loans advanced to her under the auspices of the League of Nations felt unable to continue the payment of the reparation annuities.

By the end of 1929 Bulgaria had paid in annual instalments 41 million gold francs on this head, while the interest on the capital sum of the "A" share of reparations (550 millions) amounted to 125,984,233. So that she

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728 found herself in the invidious position of seeing her indebtedness grow in spite of the disbursements she was making, the capital sum of 550 millions having accrued to 634,984,233 gold francs by the end of 1929.

The absurdity of the position became so manifest that when the Young plan for Germany came up for discussion it was decided to revise the commitments imposed on Bulgaria, and on Jan. 20, 1930 a protocol was signed at the Hague by which Bulgaria was relieved of the "B" part of the reparations, namely 1700 million gold francs payable after 1953. This was a dubious gain, for Bulgaria likewise was forced to renounce her counter-claims, which an unbiased arbitrator would have probably found to exceed this sum. Part "A" of the reparations was somewhat reduced and its mode of payment adjusted as follows:

- 1 annuity payable on April 1930 of 5,000,000 gold francs.
- 10 annuities payable between April 1, 1930 and March 31, 1940 each of 10,000,000 gold francs.
- 10 " " " " 1, 1940 and March 31, 1950 each of 11,500,000 gold francs.
- 16 " " " " 1, 1950 and March 31, 1966 each of 12,515,238 gold francs.

Bulgaria then agreed to pay these annuities unconditionally and renounced the right Art. 122 of the Treaty of Neuilly conferred on her, namely to invoke an inquiry into her capacity of payment. The transfer guarantee, however, established in connection with the League of Nations' loans was maintained and this was enough to nullify the promise Bulgaria assumed owing to her manifest inability to balance her international income and outgo.

Great Britain, France and Italy also "magnanimously" waived their claim to the balance due to them for the costs of their armies of occupation amounting still to 11,976,633 gold francs, for 'là où il n'y a rien le roi perd

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ses droits'. The disinterestedness of these Great Powers became even better manifest when they abandoned the quota parts of the problematical Bulgarian reparation which accrued to them to their minor allies, Greece, Rumania and Yugoslavia, who being on the spot would better dragoon and coerce Bulgaria into payment by "Balkan" methods the Great Powers would not dare indulge in. Obviously a most hopeful way of promoting goodwill and reconciliation among the Balkan States and to which may be traced the strained relations between Greece and Bulgaria and the tariff war the former has been waging against Bulgarian products. 175
728

The average sum of the reparation annuities which Bulgaria assumed to pay by the Hague arrangement was 11.2 million gold francs. This would have been a reasonable charge if Bulgaria possessed an excess of imports over exports which would have provided sufficient foreign exchange to meet this liability. For the payment of indebtedness requires that the net income of a State from its international trade and service operations should be equal to these outlays. Such, however, was not the case with Bulgaria for the available amount of foreign currency secured by its international income did not even suffice to defray the amortizations of her foreign loans, the payment of reparations was therefore suspended in accordance with the transfer guarantee assumed by the Reparation Commission towards the bondholders of the League of Nations' loans. But the latter did not benefit for long from this illusory guarantee, for Bulgaria bled white and exhausted by the senseless financial policy of some of her governments has practically been unable to meet even the annual charges of these loans as is related in detail in the next chapter.

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THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS' LOANS

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Owing to the non-application of the principle of nationality, regions almost exclusively peopled by Bulgarians were placed under the sovereignty of other Balkan States. The latter though they assumed certain obligations towards the ethnic minorities they incorporated, made light of such safeguards as the Treaties extended to these minorities and by a policy of ruthless denationalisation forced large numbers to emigrate and seek refuge in Bulgaria. A few years after the termination of the war, some 350,000 mostly destitute people had thus come to seek shelter in Bulgaria. They constituted a heavy burden on the country since it had to provide out of its scanty resources for the maintenance of the greater number of these unfortunate people. If the League of Nations had watched and insisted on the carrying out of the obligations imposed by the Treaties, it would have been very easy not only to have stemmed this flow of destitute people into Bulgaria, but to have obliged Bulgaria's neighbours to repatriate most of these unfortunates who had been driven from their homes by persecution.

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However nothing was done, and the Bulgarian Government finding it difficult to raise the requisite means wherewith to assist this mass of suffering humanity, appealed to the League of Nations for aid. It was reasonable to expect that the League would respond to this appeal and succour Bulgaria without seeking to exploit the misfortunes of a luckless nation, but instead, capital was made out of Bulgaria's helplessness in order to squeeze something further out of her. It is necessary for British and American holders of these loans floated under the aegis of the League, that they should realise how shamefully Bulgaria has been exploited in her hour of need for the benefit of certain International Financiers,

THE CO-OPERATIVE MOVEMENT

	Number of Associations	Members
Credit Co-operatives	1,940	367,345
Consumers' "	142	81,033
Buildings & Dwellers' Co-op.	289	10,160
Mutual furnishing "	359	73,740
Insurance Co-op. (mainly for insuring cattle) .	1,135	182,835
Producers' Co-op.	289	76,163
Unions & Centrals Co-op.	42	16,198
Total	4,203	807,474

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Of these Societies 3,165 operated in rural districts and 1,038 in towns. 58% of the members belonged to societies established in urban districts and 41% to societies established in rural districts. This figure of 807,474 is certainly excessive, but is to be explained by the fact that the same individual may figure in several co-operatives, and it is computed that there are only about 600,000 distinct members. The total capital and funds of these societies amounted to 4,347 million leva and deposits to 2,849 millions, their liabilities amounted to 4,456 millions, while their net profit for the year was reported to have reached 110,366,000 leva.

THE OBLIGATORY LABOUR SERVICE

Owing to Art. 65 of the Treaty of Neuilly abolishing military compulsory service in Bulgaria, those attaining military age are now being utilised to carry out various public works. A special law was voted rendering all men between the ages of 20 and 40 liable to serve during a term of eight continuous months in the labour corps, and subsequently they are liable to be called upon for temporary service for a term of 21 days every year within the communes in which they are domiciled. Exemption from service may be secured through the payment of a

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721) would have been placed under his command. After the fall of Kirk-Kilisse, General R. Dimitriev was prevented from pursuing the retreating enemy, and instead was ordered by Head Quarters to stop and entrench. This permitted the Turks to make a further stand at Visa and Lule Burgas. After defeating them at the latter place he was again prevented from following them up and ordered to entrench in spite of his assurances that the Turks were in full flight. The Turks themselves admit that had the Bulgarians followed up their success at Kirk-Kilisse they would have reached Constantinople before them. (Cf. Sherif Pasha's „Quelques reflections sur la Guerre.“ p. 28) Bulgarian Head Quarters could not forgive General R. Dimitriev his brilliant victories. (Cf. V. T. Veltchev's „Towards the Pogrom“).

• 728 The Turks had been so cowed by their defeats that their ambassador in St. Petersburg demanded on October 22, Russia's mediation in order that the Bulgarians might not enter Constantinople. The Ministerial Council received on October 29 from the Grand Vizier Kiamil Pasha an offer for the conclusion of an armistice and preliminary peace, approved of it and transmitted it to Ferdinand who replied only on November 1, forbidding them to transmit it to the allies of Bulgaria, and only allowed this offer to be communicated to them after ordering the attack on the Tchataldja lines. The megalomania of Ferdinand may be gauged by the text of his reply: „Deeply grieved by the Grand Vizier soliciting peace, I, as leader of the victorious and indomitable Bulgarian armies encamped under the walls of Constantinople in the name and for the honour of our country forbid the government to communicate the Turkish offer to our Allies. No steps to be taken until I consult with the leaders of the army . . . no one can oppose the desire of a 300,000 army“. The Bulgarian staff however, was able to restrain to some

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extent Ferdinand's vanity and the Bulgarian Government was accordingly allowed to negotiate with the object of gaining time; thus, instead of submitting its terms to the Turks who were asking for peace, it asked for them to enunciate their conditions. When asked to give his approval as to the terms on which the preliminary peace was to be concluded Ferdinand kept silent and the Government, though it had received from Serbia her answer to the Turkish demands, kept on waiting for Ferdinand's condescension to send it on! In spite of the fact that General Fitchew was opposed to an attack being delivered on the Tchataldja lines, Ferdinand, having made up his mind that he must enter Constantinople, ordered General Savov to launch an assault. The latter was bound to humour his master because his fate depended solely on his good will. In his late capacity of War Minister he had been gravely inculpated and was awaiting trial. According to the law, he ought not to have been placed on active service until he had been amnestied by the Sobranye, for his nomination to the post of assistant commander-in chief paralysed the prosecution against him. 728.

On November 5, after the failure of the attack on the Tchataldja positions Tsar Ferdinand wired to the Government to accept the Turkish offer. The Bulgarian delegates were not empowered to conclude peace, but only an armistice, for Ferdinand still cherished the plan of entering Constantinople.

The Government had notified him that he was free to renew operations against Turkey if he so approved. When the armistice was finally signed by Turkey with Bulgaria, Serbia and Montenegro-Greece refused to sign before she occupied Yannina — the whole of European Turkey, except the four towns of Adrianople, Constantinople, Scutari, and Yannina, were in the possession of the Balkan Allies. The negotiations for peace were transferred

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728 to London, where the Balkan delegates were convened owing to the simultaneous sitting of the delegates of the Great Powers. As early as December 19, the Bulgarian delegates were instructed by their Government to insist on the cession of all territory by Turkey to the west of the line Midia-Rodosto, and if necessary to break off negotiations. On December 14 the delegates were informed that the Bulgarian army was in a position to renew military operations in four to five days and that there was no reason to fear the breaking off of the negotiations. All this however, was bluff. General Fitchev, the head of the General Staff came to see Gueshov and reported to him that it would be senseless to expose the army by renewing the war. Gueshov immediately communicated this to the Bulgarian delegates in London, who protested at not having been informed earlier of the situation. When Ferdinand came to hear of this he expressed to Gueshov.

"His profound indignation of the unworthy and treacherous declaration of General Fitchev, which you had the weakness to communicate to Danev. I foresee that the honour of our country has been irreparably compromised. I demand the return of our delegation from London", (Cf. Peter Todorov: "The pogroms of Bulgaria" vol. p. 158).

This will go a long way to explain the obdurate intransigence of the Bulgarian delegates and the breaking up of the Conference in spite of the counsels for moderation bestowed on Bulgaria from all sides. Sazonov wired to Nekludov, the Russian Minister in Sofia on January 18:

"Sofia does not follow our advice. We shall be unable to save her from all the misfortunes which will follow through her disobeying us. She does not heed our insistent warnings to avoid taking the initiative of a rupture with Turkey. A new war with Turkey will bring no advantages to Bulgaria but only sacrifices".

In spite of the uncompromising attitude of the Young Turks who had turned out the Old Turk Cabinet of Kiamil

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Pasha on January 24, an arrangement with Turkey was possible as may be surmised from General Savov's reply to the Bulgarian Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry, had the Bulgarians showed themselves moderate in their demands. But as Peter Todorov remarks in his most informative work on this period of Bulgarian history, cited above: "modesty and restraint were not the characteristic traits of our politicians at the time". (p. 160) And he rightly defines the resumption of hostilities on February 3, 1913 as "a war on behalf of foreign interests". After their defeat at Bulair, the Turks became more resigned to make concessions and with the pressure exerted by the Great Powers to bring the campaign to a close, there were no obstacles to the conclusion of a peace save the immoderate demands of Bulgaria, which was now claiming an outlet on the Marmara, at Rodosto, in spite of the opposition of all the Great Powers to this extravagant demand. By the middle of February, in their earnest desire to put a stop to the war, the Great Powers were assuring Bulgaria that she could reckon on their support for securing the line Midia-Enos, but Ferdinand had not yet given up all hope to make a victorious entry into Constantinople, and the claim to Rodosto consequently would not be waived, while thousands of lives were needlessly sacrificed in undertaking an attack on Adrianople, the attribution of which to Bulgaria had already been decided by the Powers. The irrepresible lure of Constantinople seems to have utterly blinded Ferdinand and led him on to perdition, just as it did his prototype, Tsar Symeon. It was in vain that Sazonov warned the Bulgarians after the battle of Lule-Burgas not to seek to enter Constantinople as they would thereby raise innumerable difficulties, and even when Russia clearly intimated in March 1913 that she could not countenance Bulgaria obtaining an outlet on the sea of Marmara, Ferdinand and his entourage still remained obdurate.

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728 The thwarting of Ferdinand's ambition led to the engineering of a bitter and most unjustifiable campaign among the military circles devoted to Ferdinand against Russia, in spite of the fact that Russia had done both diplomatically and materially a great deal to assist Bulgaria in her struggle against Turkey.

The outcry against Russia was provoked not only by her not countenancing Ferdinand's desire to enter Constantinople and secure an outlet at Rodosto on the Marmara, but also because Russia was unable to hinder Rumania from putting forth claims against Bulgaria. The latter pretended that the 1902 convention was in force, though the Russians had warned her that it had lapsed and that short of provoking a European war they were not in a position to exert pressure on Rumania.

After the first Bulgarian successes Rumania had begun pressing for the cession from Bulgaria of the whole quadrilateral, delimited by the towns of Silistra, Rustchuk, Shumen and Varna, apparently as compensation for her inactivity. It was with the utmost difficulty that Russia through her intervention succeeded in whittling down these demands and settling them with the cession of Silistra only. With the temporary removal of the Rumanian menace, the Bulgarians became more exacting in their demands, and when the peace negotiations were renewed in London on April 16, progress was exceedingly slow. Both Serbia and Greece encouraged Bulgaria to make excessive demands on Turkey so as to protract the negotiations and utilise the time thus gained in strengthening their respective positions in the territories occupied by their armies, while the Bulgarian army was engaged in facing singlehanded the Turks in Thrace.

These diplomatic intrigues finally exhausted the patience of Sir Edward Grey, who, in order to secure the signing of the preliminary treaty had to intervene and forcibly intimate to the delegates that:

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"Those who are willing to sign without any alterations should do so immediately. Those who are not disposed to sign had better leave London".

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On May 30 the Treaty was signed, Turkey ceding all territory to the east of the Midia-Enos line to the Balkan Allies.

Long before the settlement with Turkey was arrived at, it became evident that there was a serious threat of conflict breaking out among the Allies over the spoils. The Serbians had first excited the distrust of Bulgarian circles when Passitch sent a circular letter on September 28, 1912, to Serbian representatives in the European capitals, urging them to make known to the governments to which they had been accredited, that the term "Old Serbia" included the towns of Uskub, Kumanovo, Tetovo, Deber, Prilep and Ochrida. The first four of which were in the contested, and the last two in the uncontested zone. It was a clear indication that certain Serbian circles did not mean to abide by the treaty and this propensity was intensified when it became evident that Austria-Hungary and Italy would not permit Serbia to secure an outlet on the Adriatic. The Serbians when they found that Bulgaria was harbouring the ambition to enter Constantinople and was for this purpose unduly protracting the war instead of concluding an advantageous peace with Turkey, suggested a revision of the Treaty in their favour. So justified did they consider their demands, and in this they were encouraged by Mr. Hartwig, the Russian Minister at Belgrade, that they proceeded to expel the Bulgarian priests and schoolmasters in that part of Macedonia which according to the Treaty was to revert to Bulgaria.

This behaviour of the Serbians naturally incensed the Bulgarians, who, though hard bargainers, are in contrast with other Balkan peoples, most scrupulously strict in fulfilling any undertaking they assume, and naturally expect

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an armistice, and turned a deaf ear to Russia's injunctions counterattacked the Bulgarians who had been ordered to cease fighting and badly mauled them. It took some time for the Bulgarian army to recover from these initial rebuffs, but in a few weeks under the able leadership of general R. Dimitriev, the situation had been retrieved. The Bulgarians were advancing on Nisch and threatening to cut the communications of the Serbian army in Macedonia, while the Greek army seemed as if it would suffer a Sedan in the Kresna defile but all these efforts of the troops were unavailing. The Rumanian army unrestrained by Russia, which could not allow Serbia to be crushed, had invaded Bulgaria and was advancing unopposed on Sofia, while Turkey, following the example set by Rumania, reoccupied Adrianople. Bulgaria was forced to capitulate and throw herself on the mercy of her vindictive enemies.

By the ensuing Treaty of Bucarest signed on August 10, Bulgaria was deprived of all share in Macedonia save the upper part of the valley of the river Struma, and received as her share of the spoils wrung from Turkey, a short stretch of coast line of the Aegean, between the rivers Mesta and Maritsa with its hinterland, the mountainous region of the Rhodopes. She was obliged to cede to Rumania the whole of the southern Dobrudja in spite of the fact that this region of 7609 sq. klm. with a population of 290,000 souls contained only 2.2% of Rumanians. One would have expected that both the Balkan States and the Great Powers would have at least exerted themselves a little in order to secure for Bulgaria that part of Thrace up an attack on their allies. Sazonov in his „Fateful Years“, p. 95, admits that it was Russia who prevented Serbia from opening hostilities: „The army was confident of success. I replied that I did not consider myself in a position to offer strategic advice, but from a political no less than a moral point of view, such a policy would cause irreparable damage to Serbia, damage for which no military success could compensate her.

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- 728 to the Midia—Enos line, which had been ceded by Turkey to the Balkan Allies, as this territorial acquisition might console to a certain extent the Bulgarians for their losses in other directions. But in her hour of need and humiliation no one would do anything for Bulgaria. Only Russia, in spite of the provocations and insults she had received from the puny politicians of Sofia, endeavoured to succour Bulgaria by offering to coerce Turkey into evacuating that part of Thrace which she had ceded by the Treaty of London, provided another Power seconded her in her efforts. But none would do so, not even England who had a moral obligation to insist on the upholding of a Treaty concluded under her sponsorship. Sir Edward Grey was busy negotiating with the Grand Vizier over the Bagdad railway, and the Turks had to be humoured, for economic considerations take precedence over moral in politics. Dr Seton Watson, in his „Europe in the melting pot“ p. 96, rightly remarks:

This abandonment of Bulgaria, rankled fatally in the minds of king Ferdinand and his statesmen, and explains as much as anything else, the distrust with which they have regarded British diplomacy, and which finally decided them to adhere to the Central Powers“.

Even the Greeks attempted to create additional difficulties for the Bulgarians. They evacuated Western Thrace without waiting for the Bulgarians to take over the administration and encouraged the local Turks to set up an autonomous government with the purpose of eventually transferring this region to Turkey, Politis¹, that pillar of the Geneva Assem-

¹ This was revealed in the Bulgarian Chamber on March 29, 1928, by the Macedonian deputy Kulishev. Greece may well ponder over the advisability of retaining in her employ such an astute and clever personality utterly devoid of moral scruples, whom S. Cosmides in his „L'Entente et la Grèce“ (vol II. p. 133 & 193-4) has not hesitated to denounce as a turncoat and a falsifier of dispatches and documents. Sir Basil Thompson in his „Allied Secret Service in

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bly, in order to win the goodwill of Turkey, advised in August 1913 the Turkish representative at Berne that it would be politic to take advantage of Bulgaria's difficulties in order to expel from Thrace the Bulgarian element which would always be a menace to the retention of this province by Turkey. This „humane“ advice was communicated in code from Berne on August 21 to the Grand Vizier, Said Halil, and promptly acted upon; a large section of the Bulgarian population being uprooted and driven out from Eastern Thrace into Bulgaria.

The indifference shown by her former Allies and the Powers of the Entente for Bulgaria's rights in Thrace, constrained her to come to terms with Turkey and even to begin negotiations with her for the conclusion of a treaty of alliance, the object of which was to attack Greece. In the autumn of 1913 General Savov was dispatched to Constantinople to conduct these negotiations and arrive at an arrangement concerning the delimitation of the Bulgaro-Turkish frontier. It may be affirmed that the disregard of Bulgaria's rights in Thrace imparted the first impetus to the policy of collaboration between Bulgaria and Turkey. Had Russia, on the other hand been supported in her attempt to champion Bulgaria's claims against Turkey, it is certain that there would have been little cause for Bulgaria being drawn into Turkey's orbit, which paved the way for her adhesion to the Central Alliance.

Tsar Ferdinand hastened to replace Danev by Radoslavov, supported by Tontchev and Ghenadiev. Radoslavov on June 22 had convoked a big public meeting, which passed a resolution in favour of declaring war on Serbia Greece“, also refers to „the mischievous tendency to distortion which characterised that gentleman“. p. 103. The advice Politis so readily proffered to Turkey, was acted upon not only in connection with the Bulgarians, but later also with regards the Greeks, and Greece has to a certain extent to thank Politis for the million and a half of hapless refugees who were dumped a few years later on her soil.

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722 The manifesto was signed by Tsanko Bakalov, Omartsevski, Al. Dimitrov and N. Atanassov, subsequently appointed ministers in the Stambuliiski Cabinet. This was not the first manifestation of open revolt against Radoslavov. In July 1916, while the budget was being voted, the Opposition and the adherents of Ghenadiév declared themselves against it and the Government would have been overthrown if Gueshov's party, bribed by the promise of securing the amnesty of three of its prominent members, compromised in the Des Closières, affair, turned round and voted in support of the Government. At the end of 1917, the Stambulovist wing had openly seceded from the Government and the latter was barely maintaining itself by various artifices. The conclusion of peace with Bolshevik Russia on February 9, 1918, did not improve the situation, for a grave conflict arose over the Dobrudja and the signing of peace with Rumania was being purposely postponed. The Germans refused to concede Northern Dobrudja and the Turks were demanding the retrocession of Western Thrace up to the Mesta river. When peace was signed at Bucarest on May 6, 1918 Northern Dobrudja was adjudged a condominium until the disputes between the allies were settled.

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This temporary solution exacerbated to the utmost the army circles and the civilians against Radoslavov. After the military success obtained by the Greek troops on May 30, General Jekov presented a scathing report on the administration accusing it of demoralising the army through its incapacity, corruption and inability to impose on the Germans the carrying out of their promises to support Bulgaria. The Bulgarian soldiers were described as being clothed in rags, destitute of food and short of artillery munitions. Ferdinand, in view of the seriousness of the situation was forced to part with his favourite and on June 21 a coalition Cabinet headed by Malinov and Kosturkov, the leaders

THE WORLD WAR

Though the situation of the Bulgarian army was known to be critical, yet no one in Sofia foresaw that disaster was imminent. The offensive, undertaken in September 15, against the Bulgarian positions at Dobro Pole met with complete success, the defence was overwhelmed and a complete breach through secured, which permitted the Entente troops to advance unopposed up the Vardar valley, attaining Veles by September 26. But apparently the extent of the disaster was not fully realised in Sofia. Malinov telegraphed to the Bulgarian representative in Berlin on September 19, insisting on the Germans conceding the Bulgarian demands on the Dobrubja in order that the morale of the troops might be raised. On September 21 Ferdinand who was in Uskub, was advised of the critical position of the army and that there was little hope of help arriving from Germany in time to retrieve the situation. It was only on September 23 that the Bulgarian army Headquarters informed the Government that some 10 divisions with artillery would be needed to stop the gap made by the enemy. A ministerial council was convoked, and on September 23 without the consent of Ferdinand, decided to demand the cessation of military activities. A Bulgarian delegation left for the front and on September 29 an armistice was concluded at Salonica. Malinov hastened to advise the German Minister in Sofia on September 26 of these intentions of his Government, and that it was useless to send help from Germany as it would arrive too late. Demoralisation had set in meanwhile in the army; the Government attempted to induce the troops to hold their positions until the conclusion of the Armistice by dispatching certain Agrarian deputies to the front headed by Stambuliiski who was purposely set free from prison, where he had been kept since the beginning of hostilities, and on September 27, Stambuliiski proclaimed a republic and made preparations for overthrowing the Go-

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vernment, but was unable to carry through his plan for lack of support. People were averse to any change in the Government at this critical time fearing lest the delegates sent to Salonica might be prevented from coming to terms with the Entente through the invalidation of their credentials brought about by such a change. In spite of the disapproval of this plan, the mutinied troops headed by Stambuliiski's colleague, R. Daskalov, attempted to march on Sofia but were dispersed on its outskirts by the few loyal troops which rallied to the support of the Government and with the assistance of some Germans who had just arrived from Odessa. On October 1, the delegation sent to Salonica returned; on the following day a conference of the leaders of all the political parties took place and Malinov was commissioned to inform Ferdinand that he owed a certain reparation to Bulgaria. With great reluctance and after vain pleading Ferdinand was persuaded to abdicate in favour of his heir, signing a manifesto to this purpose on October 3 and left for Germany followed by Radoslavov under the protection of German troops.

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The demobilisation of the army to some extent appeased the existing discontent, in spite of the difficulties the Government was meeting through the exhaustion of foodstuffs. The dearth was relieved through the timely arrival of flour from the United States. The Malinov Cabinet resigned on November 19 as a protest against the Entente's decision to cede southern Dobrudja to Rumania, contrary to the stipulations of the Salonica Armistice. It was succeeded by a broad coalition ministry presided over by T. Todorov. In May the Cabinet was reconstructed with the participation of Stambuliiski in view of the holding of elections on August 17 at which however, no party obtained a majority. The Agrarians being the most numerous party in the new Chamber assumed the task of con-

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stituting the new Cabinet with the support of Gueshov's and Danev's parties. On October 6, Stambuliiski assumed the Premiership and subsequently left for Paris where he signed the Treaty of Neuilly on November 27, 1919. 728 •

THE TREATY OF NEUILLY

The terms imposed on Bulgaria constitute a negation of all the principles for the triumph of which the best part of the youth of the western democracies had been sacrificed during the terrible yet expectant years of the Great War. The greatest evil wrought by the imposition of such a Treaty, was the destruction of the indispensable basis of peace — the mutual trust of the peoples in each other which would have been secured by the application of stern justice in the settlement of their claims. Not only the principle of nationality was completely disregarded, but concrete promises such as were made to Bulgaria on the signing of the Salonica Armistice, were ruthlessly repudiated and the country delivered over helpless to the greed of its predatory neighbours.

It was expected that Macedonia, for which Bulgaria had repeatedly gone to war would be definitely lost to her, in spite of the fact that, had a plebiscite been held, the bulk of the population would have elected to remain Bulgarian. But on the outbreak of the war, Macedonia was a constituent part of Serbia, and the Serbians had preferred to undergo the horrors of an invasion and run the risk of annihilation, rather than give up this debatable region. It could easily be grasped that in their hour of triumph, none of their allies would be willing to bring pressure to bear on the Serbians to restitute to a beaten foe a territory they had defended with such determination and such valour. This was well realised in Bulgaria, for when the late Liaptchev returned from signing the Salonica Ar-

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•728 mistice, he declared: „I, the son of Macedonia, have inscribed the tombstone of my motherland.“ What the Entente Powers were morally bound to do in order to mitigate this unavoidable wrong was to insist on the safeguarding of that minimum of elemental rights which the Minority Treaties were supposed to secure to ethnic minorities. This however, was never done, and the League of Nations, which is supposed to supervise the execution of these Treaties, by the passivity it has shown in the matter, and despite the numerous protests lodged with it by the various oppressed minorities, has largely contributed in encouraging the denationalising policy followed by certain States. The callous indifference it has shown for the sufferings endured by the minorities largely justifies such severe pronouncements as that of Prof. F. C. S. Schiller, of Oxford, passed on it, namely „that it serves to disguise by its chicaneries and makebeliefs the violence of the strong and the subservience of the weak“.

The greatest obstruction to an amelioration of the status of the minorities was the attitude of France and its satellites as the *Manchester Guardian* aptly remarked on October 3, 1930:

„France has played the part of a wrecker... The French delegation has led the opposition to any improvement in the procedure concerning minorities“.

What are crying wrongs utterly unjustifiable in themselves, because they could have been easily avoided, if the slightest sense of justice had prevailed among those who drafted the Treaties, were the amputation of Southern Dobrudja, that of Western Thrace and of certain frontier districts in Western Bulgaria.

These territorial mutilations became all the more rankling because, owing to remissness and indifference shown by the League of Nations, the cultural life of the Bulgarian minorities was completely suspended by the closing of both

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their schools and churches. And these schools and churches were in most cases extant prior to the emancipation of the Bulgarian State in 1878, so that their functioning can not be imputed to propaganda purposes. The following table shows what a heavy and unjust blow the Treaty of Neuilly has dealt to the Bulgarian people as a whole, and what a retrograde instrument the Treaty has proved, since some of its direct and immediate consequences have been the closing of some 1,594 schools and the forfeiture of the right of 97,720 children to study in their mother tongue. 728

	In Yugoslav Macedonia	In Greek Macedonia	In Greek Thrace	In the Dobrudja	In the Wes- tern Confines	Total
Schools . . .	641	340	215	276	122	1594
Teachers . . .	1013	750	333	584	269	2949
Pupils . . .	37000	19000	11877	21951	7892	97720
Churches . . .	761	378	326	125	45	1635
Priests . . .	833	300	238	1	42	1413

The Dobrudja which had been ravished by Rumania in 1913 and which contained a Rumanian minority of only 2.2% in its population, had been restored to Bulgaria by the Treaty of May 7, 1917, and Rumania given Bessarabia in compensation. (Cf. Nowak's "Collapse of Central Europe") The Allies had no moral right whatever to act unilaterally and constrain Bulgaria to renounce the benefits which this Treaty had conferred on her, without simultaneously demanding of the other contracting party an equivalent renunciation. The Rumanian Government when declaring for a second time war on Germany, on November 9, 1918, alleged that the latter had violated this Treaty, admitting thereby that it was a valid instrument. Besides, when the Salonica Armistice was signed, Bulgaria was distinctly given to understand that she would retain the Dobrudja. When

1 In the Dobrudja, the Rumanian authorities permitted the Bulgarian clergy to remain, but at their death they are replaced by Rumanian priests.

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•728 she was finally ordered to hand over the Dobrudja to Rumania, the Bulgarian Government resigned in protest at this manifest violation of the pledges it had received.

Lieut. Colonel the Hon. H. D. Napier, in his „Experiences of a Military Attaché in the Balkans“, affirms:

„Certain promises and hopes were held out to the Bulgars at that time (Salonica Armistice) which little by little were gradually whittled away, thereby damaging the reputation of the Entente for honest dealing“.

Other well-informed writers also affirm that we have treated the Bulgarians unfairly. Thus, Colonel Repington in his „After the War“ p. 368 asserts:

„Colonel Baird“, (the British military attaché at Sofia) deploras our propaganda at the end of the war. He has some of the leaflets dropped by our airmen and says that they told the Bulgarians that if they stopped fighting they would be given the territory that was Bulgarian, whereas, what with Macedonia, the Dobrudja, Tsaribrod, Thrace, and other places, nearly as many Bulgarians were now under alien rule as there were in Bulgaria herself, and unfortunately all the people in these parts were totally devoid of the faculty of conciliation, and not one of them could rule over another“.

The Dobrudja, from the time of the foundation of the first Bulgarian Empire, had always been considered as forming part of Bulgaria. When after the Russo-Turkish war its northern part was forced on Rumania by the Russians in exchange for Bessarabia which the latter detached from Rumania, all Rumanians were united in decrying the injustice which was being committed. The Senate and Chamber passed resolutions in protest and the Press unanimously declared that Rumania was opposed to annexing a region which was utterly foreign. The *Steaua României* in its issue of June 23, 1878 wrote:

„Geographically and ethnographically, the Dobrudja does not form a part of our territory; being on the other side of the Danube it is a prolongation of Bulgaria... In the future the Dobrudja will be an open wound, a cause of discord between Rumania and Bulgaria, which will be made use of by those who have an interest to embroil the two countries“.

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Could not these facts have been recalled, and the Rumanian delegates confronted with these when they were claiming the possession of the Southern Dobrudja at the Peace Conference? Bessarabia had been restored to Rumania, no one disputed her retention of Northern Dobrudja, why then permit her to incorporate Southern Dobrudja after she herself had restored it to Bulgaria by the Treaty of May 7, 1917? 728

Southern Dobrudja had formed part of the Bulgarian body politic for some forty years, and it was a case of supreme injustice to thrust it under an alien rule without regard to the wishes of the native population. At a time when Rumania was invoking the principle of nationality in order to secure her ethnic unification, her Press did not hesitate to declare:

„Sooner or later in applying the principle of nationality on which we ourselves rely for the realisation of our nation's unification we shall have to return to the Bulgarians the quadrilateral (Southern Dobrudja) which we took from them. This is a certainty." (The Bucarest *Universul*. June 15, 1915.)

Unfortunately for Bulgaria, and also for Europe, the men whom we entrusted with the task of preparing the Peace Treaties were moved by passions and prejudices, which blunted whatever native discernment they had, and made them act as if they were completely devoid of all moral sense; though some are inclined to take a more lenient view, and like the *Manchester Guardian* (May 18, 1918) explain such regrettable shortcomings by the admission that: „Diplomatists are men who seem to specialise in ignorance of foreign countries." That Great Britain is to a large extent responsible for the injustices inflicted on Bulgaria is obvious since she apparently neglected to appoint as her representatives, or delegates, to the Paris Conference men who could act without bias and who had a sense of fairness. It is a painful surprise to

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• 728 find out that one of the leading functionaries of our Foreign Office portrayed his emotions at the time as follows:

„For the Bulgarians I cherished feelings of contempt. Their traditions, their history, their actual obligations should have bound them to the cause of Russia and the Entente. They had behaved treacherously in 1913, and in the Great War they had repeated this act of perfidy. Inspired by the most material motives of acquisition they had joined with Germany and by so doing lengthened the war by two whole years. I did not feel that Bulgaria deserved more mercy than she would herself have been prepared, in similar circumstances, to accord.“ (Harold Nicolson: „Peacemaking 1919“ p. 3 /5.)

A person actuated by such sentiments could not possibly act with sufficient detachment and impartiality, in adjudicating problems relevant to Bulgaria, yet he was allowed to influence such decisions as were taken in connection with that country, and one may well express doubts as to the fairness of the verdicts arrived at. Had Mr. Nicolson been a disciple of von Treischke, and like the latter treated all the Balkan peoples with the same all embracing contempt („und wie diese Schweintreibende Völker alle heissen mögen“) one would have nothing to say; but that he should single out and vent his ill humour on the Bulgarians while heaping favours on their neighbours, is hardly a mark of the fairness by which the British are usually distinguished.

Mr. Nicolson finds that their traditions, history, and the actual obligations of Bulgarians should have bound them to the cause of Russia and the Entente. All these captious assertions show that „Diplomatists are men who seem to specialise in ignorance of foreign countries“. Russo-Bulgarian antagonism in the Balkans dates back from 967, and Mr. Nicolson's predecessors at the Foreign Office took a hand at fomenting and fostering this latent and slumbering antithesis at the time of Stambulov, so that if it ever reappeared, British diplomatists ought rather

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to congratulate themselves on the belated fruition of their own efforts. As to the Bulgarians' obligations which should have bound them to the cause of the Entente, Dr. Seton Watson whose perspective and outline have always remained unclouded, and who is our standing historical authority in East European questions, takes a diametrically opposed view to that of Mr. Nicolson, since he justifies the distrust with which British diplomacy was regarded in Bulgaria (Cf. p. 396). Another authority, Sir Thomas Holdich, in his "Boundaries in Europe and the Near East" p. 84, writes: "Bulgaria undoubtedly had a justifiable grievance" and referring to her adherence to the Central Powers he adds: "no other course would possibly have been expected of her". Mr. Nicolson in contrast with another leading man of letters, Mr. Harold Spender, who in his "Cauldron of Europe" speaks of "the community of characteristics which draws Briton and Bulgar together", is far from ascribing as Mr. Nicolson does, treachery and perfidy to the Bulgarians. This is nothing short of slander, for among Balkan peoples, it is the Bulgarians who possess the most developed sense of fairness, and it may be asserted that it was the Serbian disregard of solemnly assumed pledges which aroused the righteous indignation of the Bulgarians in 1913 and made possible the fratricidal second Balkan war. To attribute it to mere treachery is a gross travesty of truth, as is that of accusing Bulgarians of perfidy for siding with the Germans in 1915. Bulgaria was a free factor, bound by no Treaty as were Greece and Rumania. The former was bound by Treaty to succour Serbia and yet she left her ally in the lurch, while Rumania was attached to the Central Powers by an Alliance which was valid until 1920, yet she treated it as a scrap of paper. Prof. Harry N. Howard Norman in his "The Partition of Turkey", p. 176, does not hesitate to denounce Rumania's disloyalty as follows:

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Why then distort events and impute treachery and perfidy to Bulgaria, when these charges should be levelled rather at her neighbours? Is it in order to obscure public discernment and justify an altogether indefensible verdict, which Mr. Nicolson contributed in bringing about? The undisguised truth is that in dismembering Bulgaria at Neuilly, not only did we commit a crying injustice at the expense of the Bulgarian people, but we went out of our way and recompensed Greece and Rumania, both of whom manifested in their behaviour during the World War, a greater disregard for solemn compacts than Bulgaria.

It is clear that if Bulgaria was deprived of Western Thrace and of her free access to the Aegean it was merely to placate M. Venizelos. Lieut. Colonel the Hon. H. D. Napier relates (op. cit. p. 243) how he remonstrated with Mr. Philip Kerr, Mr. Lloyd George's secretary, over the threatening exclusion of Bulgaria from the Aegean and how Mr. Kerr justified himself by replying that:

"M. Venizelos had done more than any single person to further Entente action in the Near East during the war, and intimated that whatever he asked for must be granted".¹

¹ Mr Robert Lansing in his "The Big Four & Others at the Peace Conference" p. 148 writes: "the American position was frankly adverse to the Greek claims, not because of any unfriendliness for Greece or of friendliness for her enemies, but because the cession of areas inhabited by large hostile populations creates conditions which threaten the future peace of the world... Except for the personal influence of M. Venizelos. I am convinced that the extension of Greek sovereignty could not have been so great as it was under the treaties. What he asked was granted because *he* asked it". Obviously, if the personal factor was allowed to play such a prominent part, principles did not weigh heavy in the balance.

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A singularly lame justification. For if there was a man who made possible Bulgaria's adherence to the Central Powers that person was Venizelos. He had issued orders for the coaling of the Goeben and the Breslau which enabled these German ships of war to escape pursuit and arrive safely at Constantinople.¹

This secured the mastery of the Black Sea to Turkey and removed the threat of a Russian descent on the Bulgarian coast, which constituted the strongest deterrent to a Bulgarian attack on Serbia. Sir Basil Thompson published in his book a facsimile of M. Venizelos' autograph order and adds that it brought Turkey into the war against the Allies. We must agree with Mr. Kerr that no single person stimulated the Entente to such intense action in the Near East as M. Venizelos, but all these sacrifices and efforts would probably have been avoided but for that mischievous order of his. Those who are so ecstatic about this supremely clever man had better consult M. Frangulis' richly documented work „la Grèce et la Crise Mondiale“, or Cosmin's „L'Entente et la Grèce pendant la Grande Guerre“, 1914-1917, or a more recent book by S. Cosmetatos, entitled „The Tragedy of Greece“, in which its author has effectively proceeded to the debunking of the Cretan Statesman.² Assuredly, and setting all morality

¹ Cf. Sir Basil Thomson's „The Allied Secret Service in Greece“ p. 39.

² The following incident related in the latter book (p. 305) is sufficient to prove that M. Venizelos was a narrow-minded partisan rather than a Patriot. „The offensive against Kemal in June 1920 was singularly fortunate. The Greek troops advanced rapidly. They were on the point of dealing the enemy a decisive blow when France and Italy alarmed at their success, demanded from Venizelos, on penalty of withdrawing their mandate, the immediate suspension of military operations. The purpose of the demand was to save Turkey, for the partition of Turkey constituted according to the *Temps*, a diminution of the French estate in the East. Venizelos, instead of simply considering his country's interest and ridding it for ever of the Kemalist peril by sacrificing himself, if necessary, preferred to bow to the wishes of the French, whose help was indispensable to him in the civil conflict in Greece.“

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• 728 aside. it was not worth while inflicting a wrong on Bulgaria in order to recompense M. Venizelos for his disputable services to the Allied cause, for if all of them could be assessed at their true value it would be found that the debit side of the account somewhat exceeds the credit one.

The amputation of Western Thrace from Bulgaria was apparently dictated by purely mercenary considerations. Venizelos must have secured French support in exchange for the aid of a few Greek brigades at Odessa. Mr. Nicolson (op. cit. p. 260) notes in his diary February 9, 1919:

"The Italians are really determined to a separate deal with Greece by which they will obtain for their Albanian protectorate the Greek districts in the south, thereby covering the Corfu Channel. The Americans are determined not to accept this deal which to them savours of the Congress of Vienna. As regards Thrace they are still pro-Bulgar".

We may be allowed to presume that the "deal" referred to was the acceptance by Greece of the Italian point of view in Albania against Italian support for the Greek claim to Western Thrace, for diplomats excel in such underhand transactions. One wonders what were the considerations which made British politicians dispose so generously of Bulgarian territory at the time. Mr. Nicolson speaks of *his* "Arda line", (op. cit. p. 272) so that he wanted to foist on the Greeks more territory than they eventually got. His own appreciation of the manner in which his chiefs were attending to their work is illuminating:

"It is appalling that these ignorant and irresponsible men should be cutting Asia Minor to bits as if they were dividing a cake. And with no one there except me, who incidentally have nothing whatsoever to do with Asia Minor. Isn't it terrible, the happiness of millions being decided in that way, while for the last two months we were praying and begging the Council to give us time to work out a scheme". (op. cit. p. 337).

It is with such levity that supreme decisions, involving the future destiny of whole peoples were taken. And all

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this triviality, paltriness and inanity, wrapped up in diplomatic flummery, was presented to the deluded peoples as the quintessence of the wisdom of the denizens of the new Olympus. Secrosanct covenants, indeed, before which the nations should kneel for all eternity!¹ 728 •

¹ The disreputable methods used at the Peace Conference make revolting reading. To wit, the mean manoeuvres employed to defraud the Italians of their promised share in Asia Minor as revealed in Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson's Diary, Vol. II. pp. 189 191, — „Lloyd George got hold of me and Venizelos and told us the three Frocks (President Wilson, Clemenceau. & Lloyd George) had just decided to put the Greeks into Smyrna at once. . . and they are not going to tell either Italy or Turkey until the whole thing is well on the way. . . I begged Lloyd George to tell the Italians. I told him that nobody could understand our not telling one of our greatest Allies, and that no one could defend the three Frocks having secret meetings to carry out this coup . . . What rotten behaviour to a friend and Ally“.

Another unedifying chapter is that of the sordid Franco British wranglings over Arabia and the oil fields of Mossoul which estranged the two allies and made them wage a war by proxy, using the Turks and Greeks as such. Even Mr. Nicolson in his latest book „Curzon“, p. 104, admits: „that the British Government had drifted over the Arab question into a position which was very false indeed“. This initial disloyalty led France to make light of her commitments to her Ally and treat her with the same disregard as she had experienced. The pan-Arabic agitation of some British circles and their intrigues against the French in Syria still continue, as has been revealed in P. Coblenz' „The silence of Sarrail“, pp. 250—1. France was not slow in responding by committing as big a perfidy. Mr. E. H. Blerstadt in his „The Great Betrayal,“ writes: „France in handing Cilicia to Turkey did not even consult her allies though she held this territory under a mandate from the League of Nations. She betrayed her trust for the sake of economic gain and then she herself was betrayed“. As for the pretended humanitarianism which actuated our dealings with regard to the Arabs, Mr. Alexander Powell in his book „The Struggle for Power in Moslem Asia,“ says: »The people of Mesopotamia were tricked and deceived from the very beginning and forced to accept as their King an alien, belonging to another creed etc“.

Mr. Oliver Baldwin, the son of our Prime Minister, in his

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The Americans who are at a distance which permits them to judge dispassionately of our shabby squabbles, and who desired above all to establish an enduring foundation for the pacification of Europe, had an altogether different conception as to the treatment which should have been meted out to Bulgaria. The „Outline of a Tentative Report“, prepared by the American experts under Prof. Munro, discloses that not only did they insist on the holding of a plebiscite in Macedonia, but also recommended that both Western Thrace and Southern Dobrudja should be left to Bulgaria, while her southeastern frontier should be extended to the Midia-Enos line. When they could not carry their point with regard to Western Thrace, they insisted on this region being made into an autonomous province, like the Saar, or Dantsig, and this is the reason why in the Treaty of Neuilly. Section III art. 48, Bulgaria

book „The Questing Beast“ writes thus about our activities in the Near East: „We were so busy at the Versailles Conference that we forgot all about Turkey, and when it was obvious what had happened we told the Armenians to attack them (the Turks) from the east, and the Greeks from the west. Certain of our support, these two nations did so with disastrous consequences... To some it may now be clear why the phrase „Albion perfide“, was coined... General Agha Petros, commander-in-chief of the Assyro-Chaldeans in 1915 had been promised independence for his country by the British, French and Russians on condition he threw in his lot with the Allies instead of the Turks. This he did, and the result is that to-day he has been exiled by the British from his own country, denied repayment of money owed to him by the British Government, etc“. After these innumerable examples of chicanery on the part of the supercilious „Kulturträger“, to pick out the Bulgarians, who have not yet mastered the A. B. C. of diplomatic astuteness and craftiness, and to express contempt for them on account of their alleged „perfidy and treachery“, is nothing else but another instance of brazen-faced, flippant swagger. Obviously, Prof. Gilbert Murray was right when he stated that: The greatest distinguishing characteristic of our modern civilisation was its hypocrisy“ and this applies more to the West than to the semi-primitive Balkan communities.

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was asked to renounce in favour of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers all rights and title to this territory. Later when the Americans had departed from the Peace Conference and in contravention to the decision taken in common, the Entente decided in April 1920, at San Remo, to transfer Western Thrace to Greece. This was a clear breach of the pledges given both to the Americans and to Bulgaria and was not warranted by any ethnological considerations whatever, for according to the census taken under the supervision of the French, who were in occupation prior to the handing over of the territory to Greece, its population comprised: 69,155 Bulgarians, 11,739 Pomaks or Bulgarian Mohammedans, 73 220 Turks, 51,706 Greeks, 3000 Jews, 1,969 Armenians and 1,834 Gipsies. It should be noted that among the 51,706 Greeks there must have been a large percentage of Bulgarian patriarchists, who owing to their allegiance to the Greek Patriarchate, could, with the latitude inherent in elastic consciences be made to figure as Greeks. Indeed, according to the Bulgarian census taken during the world war, the Bulgarian Patriarchists figure as 30,374, while the Greeks as only 9,600.

Though by the Salonica Armistice, Bulgaria was to retain the Strumitsa valley, yet at Neuilly she was forced to cede it to Serbia, with certain other regions in Western Bulgaria, of a total area of 2,566 sq. klm. with a population of 91,888 which Serbia claimed for strategic reasons, a most flimsy pretence, since Bulgaria had been completely disarmed and rendered defenceless. Most of this territory is cut off from Serbia by inaccessible mountains and has its natural outlets in Bulgaria from which it has been severed, to the immense suffering of the local population, which has been cut off from its markets.

According to the secret clauses of the Salonica convention Bulgarian troops were assigned certain definite

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- 728 aims in view of an eventual co-operation with the Entente troops. M. Poincaré in his Memoirs (p. 374) related a conversation he had with Clemenceau in 1918 in which reference was made to three Bulgarian divisions and to Greece's unwillingness to make use of them. M. Poincaré concluded with the remark: „Pour y reussir, il ne faut pas laisser les Bulgares se mêler à notre expédition contre la Turquie“. Bulgaria was to be treated as a benevolent neutral and even as a prospective ally. Had these views prevailed, both Great Britain and Greece could have reckoned on Bulgarian support. Mr. Lloyd George would not have then had to suffer the fiasco of his Grecian policy, nor Greece to rue the Asia Minor disaster.

It was indeed a great pity that the example set by Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman towards the Boers was not followed anew towards the Bulgarians. Both Mr. Lloyd George and M. Venizelos would have found out that there is some fundamental truth in the golden old maxim „οὐδέν γὰρ οὕτω μεγαλοφροσύνης ποιητικόν“. Or in Burke's words, „Magnanimity is not seldom the truest wisdom“. Had it been applied, Great Britain would not have had to abandon the dominant position she occupied at the Straits which had cost her so much blood and treasure to acquire and she would not be to day on sufferance at Mossoul, the precarious hold on which she owes entirely to the oportune dispatch of a few Italian brigades to Rhodes by Signor Mussolini at the time Mossoul's fate was hanging in the balance.